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Abstract  
   
This research project examines the role of social media in political activism with a particular focus 
on the unfolding events of protests in Iran during the years 2009 and 2017 to 2019. Social media 
platforms provide tools for people to gather, document, and publish information in the online 
sphere. Also, these tools provide an opportunity to connect millions of users together so that they 
can share their thoughts and experiences. Social media has the power to help people in organizing 
protests to challenge the established governments. In Iran in 2009, a series of political unrest 
happened following the presidential election in that year. Twitter and Facebook played a significant 
role in uniting people to document the events and share them with the Western media. During the 
years 2017-9, the Iranian protestors used social media platforms such as Telegram and Instagram 
to share information for the internal audience inside the country. The Iranian government’s 
response to these two major social media political activism was different because nature and the 
intended audiences were different. In 2009, the regime’s responses were mostly gatekeeping and 
disinformation campaigns. In 2017-9 events, policing and military measures such as arresting 
activists and shutting down telecommunication services were more prominent.   
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Introduction   
   
 Social media platforms are connecting millions of users around the globe and allowing them to 
create and share information. The related objects of study in this paper are social media and 
participatory media, where users can have interactions and influences. Social media platforms are 
those websites and applications that allow users to share content quickly and in real-time (Hudson), 
and participatory media is media in which the audience plays an active role in creation, publication, 
and dissemination of information (Participatory Media - Wikipedia). The word “platform” here 
refers to any tools that can provide an opportunity to users to project their voice, express their 
thoughts, and disseminate information, analogous to traditional auditorium stages which offer a 
platform for similar purposes. A social media platform can be classified as a participatory media 
tool as well. For example, in applications such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram, 
users can create value and content and publish it in these applications, and they can reach a number 
of audiences that they can interact with around a topic of common   
interest.    
 In this paper, it is argued that people can influence politics and have an active role in bringing 
political changes by using social media platforms. Computer technology, participatory media, and 
social media have the power to gather people together and give them the ability to share 
information around a political topic so that they can organize protests in response to events.   
To accurately show the power of social media in context, the focus is on social media activism in   
Iran during two periods: the 2009 post-election events, and the series of uprisings from 2017 to 
2019. These two timeframes share a similarities in uniting the Iranian protestors and the use of 
social media in documenting and sharing information. However, they are different in terms of the 
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intended audience, the complexity of social media use, the number and demography of participants 
and the Iranian regime’s response to the uprisings.    
 This paper has three major parts. The first part is an introduction to the role of computer technology 
and ICT, as a whole, in politics and the contributions it has had to the field of politics. Most notably, 
computer technology has made access to information more possible for people and politicians. For 
example, a user can search for legal and political documents online, permitting if the state has made 
them available online because such procedures can provide a digital interaction between citizens 
and the government to facilitate ease of communication.    
The second part of the paper focuses mainly on the role of participatory social media 
platforms and their role in politics. This part is based on the definition of participatory media, and 
what constitutes such platforms. The second section discusses the features and tools that 
participatory media provide to influence and change the realm of politics.  For instance, these 
platforms can be a tool in the hands of the public to easily create and transmit a political message 
to their peers without the influence of the governments and mainstream media agencies. The 
constant battle between social media users and state media hegemony to control the narrative of 
events is something that is taken to social media applications now, and this new medium has 
become the setting for documenting and sharing such information.     
The third part is a case study of the use of social media in Iran’s political protests and how 
social media was influential in the series of events in 2009 post-election and the uprisings of 2017 
to 2019.    
Has technology changed political activism?   
Technology has advanced at high speed in the past few years. Electronic devices are widely 
accessible, and almost every one of them connects to the Internet in some ways. Mobile phones 
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could be an interesting example in this political context because they have played an important role 
now that smartphone ownership is on the rise and has become a prominent device for social media 
and communication activities for millions around the globe (Wei). They are not just a device to 
receive calls or send text messages, but they can bring political change and revolutions, because 
“the availability of cellphones as a communication technology allows political groups to overcome 
collective action problems more easily and improve in-group cooperation, and coordination” 
(Pierskalla and Hollenbach 207). Smartphones take the notion of connectivity to networks to a new 
level because they are able to connect more people by using the Internet and Internet-based 
applications like social media platforms.    
When participatory media finds its way into politics, it can cause significant changes, such 
as bringing down a government or start a global movement. The recent political history of the world 
shows many examples of such activities. The Arab Spring, for example, was a series of 
prodemocracy protests and activities in several Muslim countries, such as Syria, Libya, and Egypt, 
where the people used social media tools to document and organize protests and bring down their 
dictators. Their efforts created a massive pool of data using relevant hashtags that linked millions 
of posts together for collective activism and networks of online interactions between different 
groups of people (History.com editors; Bruns et al.). The Iranian 2009 post-election protests are 
another example where the nation used social media applications such as Twitter to perform the 
same roles in sharing and documenting the series of events (PEJ New Media Index). In a recent 
example in 2020, the Black Lives Matter movement was initiated by outraged Facebook posts 
about the death of Georg Floyd and police brutality that sparked actions and protests in the streets 
to seek justice against racial discrimination (Maqbool). The #BlackLivesMatter and #BLM 
hashtags functioned as an ideological and political intervention affirming black people’s value to 
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society and humanity, and showing their resilience in face of oppression (Hobson 23). These 
examples of the role of social media in creating political movements and prompting citizens’ 
participation show the effectiveness of social media to create powerful political discourses and to 
induce real-world changes.    
Social media platforms operate on the infrastructures of the Internet. The Internet has been 
embedded in our lives to the extent that many governments have set policies to embrace or 
condemn it. The emergence of computer technologies and communication tools such as the Internet 
has created new terms like e-democracy and e-governments to show the relationship of electronic 
tools and real-life facilities and establishments. Electronic government refers to providing 
government services by means of ICT, allowing traditional ways of administration to move to 
internet-based delivery of government information and business to citizens (Kardan and Sadeghiani 
467). Next, electronic democracy is the social and political collective participation of governments 
and citizens to express thoughts, identities, and information via tools such as social media platforms 
to create a new way of citizen participation and engagement in the policy and lawmaking processes 
(Kreiss). These definitions are particularly applicable to Iran’s case as the country has a high 
Internet penetration rate, a high number of computer users, and a high rate of mobile phone 
ownership, which are the gates of access to information and political activism.      
Access to mobile phones (especially Smartphones) is a critical topic in this study because 
they are the most widely used devices in the hands of the public with access to the Internet and 
social media applications. The study of mobile phone ownership rates and the demography of 
mobile phone users gives a clearer picture of where these users are coming from and what their 
characteristics are. Mobile phones have spread around the world rapidly. It is estimated that more 
than 5 billion people have mobile devices, with smartphones holding more than half of this market 
 
  5  
(Silver and Taylor n.p.). The Pew Research Centre report on the penetration rate of mobile phones 
states that: “whether in advanced or emerging economies, younger people, those with higher levels 
of education and those with higher incomes are more likely to be digitally connected,” and also, 
“younger people…are much more likely to have smartphones, access the Internet and use social 
media.” In addition to the Pew’s report, the Iranian Students’ Polling Agency (ISPA) conducted a 
survey showing more than 63 percent of the country’s population over the age 18 are active social 
media users (“How Much Time Iranians Spend on Social Media”).  Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the majority of the population behind social media activism is from a young age group.    
In addition to mobile device ownership, the Internet use rate is revealing as well. The Pew 
Research Centre, in their 2019 survey, found that Internet use is almost universal in developed 
countries like the United States, Australia, and South Korea. Moreover, more than half of the 
population in emerging economies have used the Internet. The authors of the report have narrowed 
down the definition of Internet users to those who “ever use social media sites like Facebook or 
Twitter – even if they said they did not own a smartphone or use the internet”; they define internet 
users “as anyone who uses social media or owns a smartphone, even if they report not using the 
internet.” This definition of Internet users will be applied in this paper to the Iranians who actively 
participated in any of the online political practices because they have an active role in organizing 
protests and documenting the events online for content sharing.    
In addition to civilians and ordinary people on social media, the politicians, heads of states, 
and whoever possesses the power to rule over certain people are part of the demography of 
technology users as well. For example, political figures such as US president Donald Trump and 
Iranian president Hassan Rouhani use social media accounts. In their social media presence, they 
can convey political messages, and the public can engage in political debates with them, especially 
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in those social media applications that provide commenting features. This two-way model of 
communication is important because such activities can create a dialogue about a political issue, 
which in turn can influence the politics of a country at upper levels.    
A notable example of these exchanges is the incident in which Iran’s Minister of Foreign   
Affairs, Javad Zarif, and Christine Pelosi, the daughter of Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of House of 
Commons, entered into an online Twitter debate about Holocaust and the Jewish new year.    
  
Figure 1: the Twitter debate between Javad Zarif and Christine Pelosi (Zarif)  
Javad Zarif, who assumed office in 2013, is here engaging in a political/cultural 
exchange with an activist figure from the United States (Rayman), and explaining a subtle change 
in Iran’s politics and approach to anti-Semitism practices in contrast with the previous office 
holder, President Ahmadinejad. The Internet is full of these examples, which shows the importance 
of social media platforms as a communication tool enabling politicians and civilians to influence 
politics and cultures by creating an engaging debate over a shared topic of interest.    
Politicians and the general public are influencing each other more than ever in modern times 
due to their active participation, negotiation, and communication in the online sphere. It is essential, 
then, to see how politics has been affected by this new tool because “we are citizens, but we are 
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also subjects [of the state]… We have a right to participate, but we also have responsibilities for 
maintaining the political system” (Qvortrup 58). It is through active participation of subjects and 
citizens in the online domain, like Christine Pelosi’s debate with Minister Zarif, that people can 
create a movement to demand their political rights and fight for freedom.  These types of collective 
activities on the Internet can make e-democracy a realty, with ICT measures being used for an 
active role of people in policy and decision making in their political affairs.    
Participation is the key concept here. In democratic and free countries, the populace of a 
nation has the ability to assert their political views and beliefs through different channels, let it be 
voting or peaceful protesting. On the other hand, in less democratic countries or even in 
dictatorships, though citizens’ political activities are forbidden or allowed only within the rules of 
the regime, the new generation and the general public find ways in which to make their voices 
heard. For example, The Arab Spring movement started from the viral circulation of the images 
and videos of Mohammed Bouazizi setting himself on fire, which in turn created a revolutionary 
discourse on social media platforms leading to protests pouring onto the streets. These events 
crippled some Arab countries like Tunisia, and started a civil war in case of Syria (Howard et al.).  
The semiotic processes of such pictures and videos have significant emotional, political, or cultural 
impacts. These values of meaning are being shared more rapidly and efficiently in social media 
platforms nowadays, and users can access this information better than, for example, in the era of 
print media domination. The “power of online participatory platforms should be understood as the 
governance of semiotic open-endedness”. Therefore, the concept of participation in social media 
“should be revisited to pay attention to the networked conditions that enable it,” which means the 
focus should be on topics such as “cultural practices that make the production and circulation of 
meaning possible” (Langlois 91), as Mohammad Bouazizi’s pictures created an online turmoil 
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because they became upsetting images of the inaptness of the Arab governments.  These images 
and videos can feed the online participation of the users, they help create an initial discourse in the 
online sphere, and they have the power to move activity expressing political grievances to the next 
level, such as protests on the streets.    
The growing number of politically active youth and young adults shows that politics is 
moving from the traditional manner of representation in places like the House of Commons or the 
parliaments to the streets where people demand their rights and wants. When participation of the 
people coupled with technology finds its way onto the streets, these significant movements can 
attract worldwide attention and bring about changes, negative or positive. For example, the 
unprecedented revolution organized by the youth (and the rest of the nation, later on) in the Middle 
Eastern countries led to overthrowing dictators like Hosni Mubarak as part of the Arab Spring 
movement. This push from the public is a statement of the changing effects of people and 
technology on politics where ideology, people, and technology could be the winner for once 
(Blakemore).    
In addition to participation, the roles of new media (specifically social media), the Internet, 
and television are essential in political changes. The real potential of these new media is the power 
of quantities: the large number of networks and connections of people in an online domain. In fact, 
social media’s real power is in supporting civil societies and the public sphere, which will produce 
change over time (Shirky) because such online platforms can connect a large number of people 
together for active mutual communication. In traditional print media such as newspapers, for 
example, there was hardly any participation from the public, and they were mainly consumers of 
the distributed information.    
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The scope and number of the audience and how people can interact with one another or 
with the producer of information is the main difference between traditional print media and the 
new media. For instance, the student uprising of July 1999 in Iran following a new parliamentary 
bill curbing press freedom and the banning of a major reformist newspaper, Salam, mostly involved 
Tehran University’s students (BBC News | MIDDLE EAST | Six Days That Shook Iran). This news 
did not reach other cities, unlike protests of the 2009 post-presidential election and onwards, 
because there was hardly any social media presence or Internet penetration rate at that time in Iran. 
In 2009, the protesters could benefit from communication tools like the Internet and social media 
that were more accessible and widespread to have political influence.  New media gave the power 
to the people to create a dialogue around political subjects and participate in the political realm. 
This two-way feature of communication, along with the speed of sharing information, are integral 
features of new media that give the ability to people to induce political change.    
Communication and access to information are the main features that technology has brought 
to modern politics. Communication is the core of politics and political participation because politics 
“can be seen in terms of communication concerned with influencing public opinion” (De 
Landtcheer et al. 126). New media, now, works as a mediator between the politicians and the 
public. The political activities of the two resonate between two models of bottom-up and top-down 
systems in politics where the first one is emergent movements from the public, or on the streets, to 
bring change to the state (Stone and Squires n.p.) and the latter is when the institutionalized power 
forces a prescribed form of government onto its subjects, as seen mostly in forms of control-from-
above in totalitarian regimes (Periwal n.p.). With the rise of social movements around the world, 
new media and social media are helping the bottom-up political activism because citizens’ 
participation keeps political systems balanced by legitimizing or condemning the actions of 
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political leaders through citizen support, or lack of it (Barber n.p.). Moreover, since political 
participation is information-seeking, the Internet and social media platforms that can serve this 
purpose have a prime effect on the trends and directions of politics.    
De Landtsheer et al. provide four dimensions of how computer technology and social media 
have changed modern politics for good.     
First, next to the mass communicative features of technology, there comes information and 
stored knowledge. The Internet and everything that comes with it is a giant web of computers and 
users creating, publishing, distributing, and storing knowledge. Any kind of political document 
could be made instantly available. In Iran’s case, for example, major political offices have websites 
that are accessible in different languages with detailed information about that office. The Iranian 
president’s website (http://president.ir) is a place where information about both the office and the 
current holder of it, along with related news items, can be found. Such stored knowledge increases 
e-political knowledge and awareness about political issues at hand.   
 Active political discussions within community connections is the second dimension. Civic 
networks bring political issues that the community is concerned about, and citizens can benefit 
from online/offline collective public discussions. The Internet has made it possible for the 
politicians and the public to engage in dialogues with each other and amongst themselves. Twitter 
is a prime example of an application with such features.    
The third dimension, and an important one, is the matter of voting. The Internet helps in 
attracting the public’s attention and casts a broader net to connect candidates and political parties 
to their audiences. Traditional media (TV and print media) are partisan-based and also fail to 
provide all the necessary information due to their distribution limitations. In contrast, the Internet 
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and social media compensate for those deficits by providing new tools for broadcasting a political 
message and participating in political activities.    
The fourth dimension is the political activities of the public for which the Internet has 
provided many opportunities. For social movements, the Internet is “increasingly useful for 
overcoming the problem of collective action” because it provides a direct and interactive channel 
of communication where “citizens can tell their representatives their demands and needs at length.” 
If the communication between the citizens and the local representatives fails, then social media has 
the power to aid the people in forming political activities to protest, which can be an extreme case 
of political action.  To provide an example, Twitter was banned in Iran in 2009 when the regime 
realized its role in documenting the protests. However, the protestors used tools such as Virtual 
Private Network (VPNs) to mask their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to provide access to 
restricted websites with greater privacy and security. Such practices to access social media tools in 
order to engage in political discussions can “fuel activist protest and sustain revolution” 
(Wojcieszak and Smith 105) because even by trying to circumvent the ban on Twitter, the Iranian 
social media user is showing an act of revolt and political rebellion.    
De Landtsheer et al. have provided a detailed framework of how the Internet has changed 
our political spheres. However, governments in power and traditional media still have a significant 
role in the process as well, to the point that they can hinder the social movements of their citizens. 
Regarding access to information, it is the politicians and governments that have to provide the 
required political information in an appropriate form for their citizens (Barber et al.). Alternatively, 
if they obstruct the stream of information by such means as censorship, they deny their citizens the 
vital basis of political participation: knowledge and information, as in Iran’s attempt to curb the 
voice of the revolution in 2009.   
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Moreover, mainstream media, such as television and print media, can divert and alter the 
narrative of political events through the means of gatekeeping the information. The mainstream 
press decides what events become news or points of focus. Therefore, they are in a constant battle 
with other channels of information such as social media platforms that provide almost unlimited 
access to information. When social media undermines “the idea that there are discrete gates through 
which political information passes” (Williams and Delli Carpini 61) the citizens can find alternative 
ways to access that information because it is more difficult to practice gatekeeping of information 
when it is produced and distributed in massive quantities.    
A recent example of gatekeeping practices in Iran was when Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, 
held a press conference on Journalists’ Day in 2019 but failed to invite international press 
correspondents to the event, thereby limiting international media presence in Iran. Such actions are 
further supported by a ban from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance that has stopped 
issuing permits to journalists from foreign media (Rezaian). In contrast, social media enabled the 
rise of citizen journalists who are documenting events inside of Iran, and the western media can 
access this pool of information for their journalistic practices now. The presence of social media in 
times of conflicts such as the protests in 2009 allows for circumventing the gatekeeping of the 
Iranian regime and its state media.    
The Internet did not have the necessary means to support social media applications in the 
early years of its existence. It is important to know how the Internet technology has evolved to 
provide the infrastructures to host social media platforms. The invention of Web 2.0 technology 
paved the way for the emergence of social media platforms and a participatory mode of interaction 
and communication in the online sphere. Web 2.0 is a series of tools, computing solutions, and 
protocols that makes it easier to create online applications that are dynamic and are highly social 
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allowing the users to manipulate and interact with content and data (Wolcott), which in turn allows 
for a participatory and interactivity culture for the users. To provide examples for this shift from 
Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 and how this changes the user experience, Tim O’Reilly lists the following:    
Web 1.0   Web 2.0   Example of Change   
Content management systems   Wikis   Any user can participate in 
changing a wiki post   
Publishing   Participating   Users can engage in 
conversation about a post in 
the comment section   
Personal websites   Blogging   Microblogging services such 
as Twitter that provide timely 
and rapid information sharing  
services allowing other users 
to interact with the post   
Table 1: What are Web 2.0 Examples (O’Reilly)   
In their core, all of the above examples show the potential for participation by a higher number of 
users and rapid content creation and sharing abilities that Web 2.0 gifted to the online sphere.    
Social media applications that run on Web 2.0 infrastructure show the complicated 
interactive relationship between content publishers and content users in an online platform. From 
popular cultural productions on YouTube to organizing political protests on Facebook and Twitter, 
“user-generated content models have offered new hope and new possibilities for public 
reinvolvement in affairs of common interest,” as Langlois explains (92). These sorts of 
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relationships are the reason why social media studies are essential because it is due to these 
platforms that the relationship between communicative participation through technology and 
democratic communication and action has been renewed and revived (Jenkins).    
In addition to the connectivity and real-time features of social media, other factors are 
contributing to the ways in which social media could change the face of politics to the point that 
people can organize revolutions. The basics of any social media platform, or even the mainstream 
mass media, is the innate need of human beings for communication and interaction within societies. 
“From this perspective, communication is first and foremost a human affair, and online 
technologies are here to support the creation and sharing of cultural meanings” (Langlois 94). 
Furthermore, what the Internet and social media are offering to people is a place where individuals, 
groups, or organizations can have their voices heard, and they can express who they are by 
“exchanging meanings, representations, and information” (94) as seen in the following screenshot 
showing a social media user identifying themselves with the Green Movement in Iran.    
  
Figure 2: (“Iran Election 2009”)  
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During the 2009 protests in Iran, one of the significant slogans on the streets was “Obama, 
are you with them [the regime] or us [the people]?” (Protests in 2009 Calling Obama for Help), 
and the videos of these rallies were circulating on YouTube. The videos of protestors asking for 
help from Western powers reached the White House, and President Obama took a stance in 
solidarity with Iranian protestors condemning the violence from the riot Police in Iran (Levs). 
These examples show how social media platforms enable people to have a voice and for an intended 
audience (the US in Iran’s 2009 post-election) to hear that message and get involved in the process 
of exchanging values and thoughts.    
Social media applications are a platform for raising awareness and distributing information 
to other users via networked connections. Langlois takes the literal definition for “platform” when 
writing about social media: a stage where the speaker can disseminate a message to an audience, 
and the audience can engage with him/her or amongst themselves about the message. Langlois 
summarises the tools and features of social media platforms for political activism as the following, 
in addition to the core connectivity features of any communication tools.   
First is the User/Network paradigms. The user-centric paradigm focuses on the question of 
cultural expression, and the network paradigm deals with processes of transmission. The former 
refers to content creation and activities of users, and the latter to the technical elements that make 
it possible for such activities to happen.   
The second feature is transparency and hypermediacy, which refers to the presence of a 
medium to transfer human thoughts into cultural symbols online: for example, the ability to use 
buttons or pictures rather than command lines. Hypermediacy is the process of recognizing the 
participatory media environment on par with human users. An excellent example of this can be the 
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recommendation software on social sites such as Facebook that can suggest a specific 
advertisement according to users’ online interactions.    
The third factor is the production and circulation of meaning.  Participatory media platforms 
allow for the production and distribution of meaning via cultural signs. The word “meaning” here 
should be understood as making sense of the world. Social media, then, allows for transferring such 
meanings from the real world into the cyber world. Communication, once a purely human 
experience, is now “constantly mediated by software as the agent not only linking the users to 
hardware but also to culture” (98).    
The last feature is social media platforms as conduits for governance. The concept of 
governance is central to understanding that even though social media has helped with the 
“decentralization of communication online,” it does not mean that the power struggle and power 
relations have disappeared. However, on the contrary, the power is shifting from control over 
content to “the management of meaningfulness and attribution of cultural values” (99). For 
example, the government is the sole body to provide television and radio services for the country 
which has autonomous control over the management of cultural values proposed in this specific 
channel (Bruno), but in the case of Iranian people’s protests and its depiction on social media, it is 
evident that the state media has less control over active social media users in the online sphere in 
the management of content creation and distribution of information to alter the narrative in favour 
of the Iranian regime.    
With the explosion of information in social media, there is now the question of what 
“meaning” becomes more valuable, and this is in the hands of both the politicians and the public 
because the common feature of social media platforms is that they allow users, both politicians and 
the public, to not only to create content but to decide what becomes culturally meaningful and 
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shareable (e.g. hashtags in Twitter, share feature on Facebook, Direct Messaging and reposting on 
Instagram). This is one of the most powerful features of social media platforms, as anybody who 
can learn how to use or manipulate the systems and algorithms can disseminate their intended 
message better.    
Taking into consideration the above features about social media platforms, one might 
speculate that these online tools and environments hold a degree of democracy and can be used for 
democratic and collective political activism. This can be partly true. However, the ability to create 
content and meaning without (or with lesser) censorship is only one part of this equation. What 
matters the most here is that, in the online world, there still exist hierarchies and roles of power 
which can govern the conditions in which what “meaning” can be seen/heard or not. Social media 
manipulation has turned into a big business. More than 48 countries are investing more than half a 
billion dollars in developing strategies such as disinformation campaigns and online psychological 
manipulation to gain influence the public users who are online in social media platforms (Bradshaw 
and Howard 3). Therefore, the power of social media platforms is not in the content per se, but it 
depends upon who gets to control the stream of the information: the public, the politicians, or the 
software companies who created this online world.    
Iran: The Internet Profile    
After presenting the theories concerning the role of technology, the Internet, and social 
media in politics at its general level, it is useful to see how such findings are applicable. The Internet 
and social media platforms are tools in the hands of governments and public users. As the people 
and governments are different in each part of this world, then, Internet usage and online political 
activities should follow more local traditions and practices as well.    
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The purpose of this paper is to focus on the role of social media platforms in the recent 
Iranian political environment. Most notably, Iran has undergone two major events of social media 
political activism in the recent decade. The first one is the civil political unrest following the 2009 
presidential election disputes that led to the emergence of “the Green Movement” and “The Twitter 
Revolution in Iran.” The second wave of participatory media civil unrest started in 2017 and is 
famous for the role of two specific social media applications: Telegram and Instagram. Before 
analyzing the role of social media in these political movements, it is vital to understand the 
demography of Iranian citizens and how the system of government concerning the Internet works 
in that country.    
Iran is a country in the Middle East with a population of around 84 million people whose 
median age is 32 years old, and more than 75 percent of the population live in urban areas (Iran 
Population (2020) - Worldometer). Iran has a young population in a world where information 
technology is at its peak. In a national survey in 2018, more than 46 million in Iran have access to 
the Internet, which makes up 64 percent of the population (Tehran Times ). This data shows a high 
penetration rate for the Internet among Iranian users. Online political activity has been on a rise in 
Iran since 2009, and internet use data shows a growing number of participants in the online domain 
as well.    
Policies and laws in regulating the Internet in Iran   
Iran underwent a significant political change in 1979 when the Islamic Revolution replaced 
the last monarch of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. After that, the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran was adopted by a referendum held on December 2nd and 3rd of 1979. The new 
constitution changed the system of state from a parliament-monarchy to an Islamic Republic, 
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vesting the sovereignty in God and the role of revelation in ruling and appointing of a Supreme 
Leader as the head of state.    
For this brief introduction of Iran’s profile regarding the Internet, it is crucial to know the 
legal and constitutional basis for telecommunications in Iran because broadcasting services of any 
form (print or internet media) is state-owned and heavily regulated and monitored by the 
government of Iran. The justification for such control over the access to information comes from 
Chapter XII, Article 175, of the constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression and thoughts 
as long as they align with the Islamic criteria and rules and to the best interest of the country 
(shoragc.ir). The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) of Iran is the 
executive branch of the government to provide access to the Internet for the country for both public 
and private Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and mobile service providers that offer internet 
access to their users.    
In addition to the ministry of ICT, the supreme leader of Iran has ordered the 
implementation of other offices and bodies with a transnational jurisdiction to join and gather all 
the stakeholders of the Internet and Information Technology in Iran. The approved general policy 
dated in 1993 states that the digital networks of information of any kind should adhere to the laws 
and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure the safety of political security, cultural and 
social norms, and economic practices. Moreover, the level of access to digital services should be 
restricted according to the purpose of use and only through the established organizations. This 
mandate continues: participation in the cyber world should be for the creation and dissemination 
of information and essential services based on Islamic thoughts and cultural values (Expediency  
Discernment Council- Approved General Policy 18-08-1372 of Ettelaresani). Access to the  
Internet is heavily regulated through a web of governmental and judicial offices and councils. 
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This approved policy paved the way for the creation of two prominent offices, which have the 
highest levels of control in internet surveillance of the Iranian citizens: the Iranian Cyber Police 
and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace.    
The Cyber Police, launched in 2011, oversees criminal activities on the Internet and social 
media. In addition to regular crimes such as hacking, this police force actively seeks to identify  
political  protestors  who  have  a  social  media  presence  and  it  has  put  forth  
intelligence/counterintelligence operations (Fars News Agency) to combat social media political 
activism. At the national level, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace is chaired by the president. 
Also, it gives seats to the head of the parliament and the head of the judiciary system and ministers 
and military generals. The council members have the power to pass policies, which then become 
enforced law to control and monitor Iran’s cyberspace and to efficiently monitor and supervise 
digital activities in Iran (Supreme Council of Cyberspace). These two offices, along with the rest 
of the network of control in Iran, have been a significant force in shutting down political activism 
throughout the Internet and social media platforms for Iranian citizens.    
Events of 2009 in Iran: The Twitter Revolution and Citizen Journalism   
 The presidential election in Iran back in 2009 was the steppingstone for online political activism.  
President Ahmadinejad claimed victory with nearly 63 percent of the votes and his opponent, 
MirHossein Mousavi, also claimed victory (Both Sides Claim Victory in Presidential Election in 
Iran - The New York Times), which led to political disputes and the start of protests and civil unrest 
called the “Green Movement,” where the protestors wore green wrist and headbands representing 
Mr. Mousavi’s campaign colour (Tait et al. n.p.). In the following days of the election, protestors 
used social networking platforms to document and organize the protests.    
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The protestors found out that technology, the Internet and social media, could be practical 
tools to disseminate information about organizing the protests and also to send information to the 
outer world about the current events of Iran. Social media networks allowed Iranian citizens to 
send visual and textual data to the general public and international press to reach audiences beyond 
Iran (EDITORIAL: Iran’s Twitter Revolution - Washington Times). Though the Iranian government 
quickly started to censor the Internet and unleash police forces onto the streets to control the 
protests, this massive wave of participation on social media platforms went viral around the world 
to the point that some western media such as Newsweek magazine recognized the 2009 Iranian 
protests as the “true birthplace of citizen journalism” (Ali and Fahmy 59). The aftermath of 2009 
post-election events in Iran is a prime example of gatekeeping practices by the governments to shut 
down the citizens’ voices.    
 After the election day and announcement of the result, millions poured onto the streets and rallied 
with “Where is my vote?” as their main slogan (Debashi). The majority of the protestors were 
young people who were demanding reform in the current Islamic state to move to a secular state 
by shouting “Independence, freedom, Iranian republic” (a changed statement from the 1979 rallies 
against the last Shah of Pahlavi stating “Independence, freedom, Islamic Republic”) (How Iran’s 
Opposition Inverts Old Slogans). Immediately after the crowds of people brought protests to the 
streets, the regime took radical measures to shut down means of communication in Iran, including 
shutting down Short Message Service (SMS), voice services, and landlines, terminating media 
coverage permits for foreign media agencies, arresting and jailing journalists, and gatekeeping 
information in state media to alter the narrative (Stern).  However, a few channels remained open 
as the government did not realize the potential to document and organize protests as the officials 
of the country were unaware of communication tools on social media platforms.   
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With the usual sources of information blocked, Iranian citizens moved to the online sphere 
and social media platforms to a) gain access to news and information, b) organize protests, c) 
document and share information about the protests for the outer world, and d) conduct and practice 
information warfare (Carafano n.p.). Iranian citizens created and published their own news stories 
concerning the events of the protests and shared them online on websites such as Facebook and 
Twitter. The regime realized that protestors were still coming to the streets despite 
telecommunication restrictions and it found that social media was at play in these organizations.  
Therefore, the regime put sanctions on such websites and reduced Internet services as all the   
Internet traffic goes through one company in Iran, the Telecommunication Company of Iran 
(Black). Iranians found ingenious ways to bypass Internet restrictions by using different tools such 
as VPNs as mentioned above, in addition to Proxies, Anti-filtering software, and encrypted 
messages (Black). Regardless of bypass efforts, access to the online sphere became more difficult 
for Iranian protestors. Consequently, word of mouth remained the primary method of information 
sharing and communication for the people inside of the country, while social media became a tool 
for the Iranian diaspora to organize protests outside of Iran, or for tech-savvy Iranians to 
disseminate information online for Western media to gain access to the current event news 
concerning the protests (Keller). The Iranian state media holds the majority of power for content 
management inside the country, and it can publish content in massive numbers to influence the 
public. However, access to citizens’ recorded data and information in online websites (PEJ News 
Coverage Index) gives the power to Western media and Iranian citizens to challenge the state’s 
narrative and enter into information warfare.     
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The Pew Research Centre, in their June 2009 article, published a media analysis of Iran’s 
protests to show how the information regarding the events was surfacing on the internet and social 
media websites (PEJ New Media Index).   
  
Figure 3: Iran became the number 1 link on Twitter  
   
  
Figure 4: Iranian protestors image mentioned in Pew’s report  
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These popular links connected online users to a CNN story on how Iranians were using social 
media for mobilizing and documenting the events and to a picture of protests in Iran that sparked 
many user activities in the comment and reply sections on Twitter in support of Iranian protesters 
and their effort for freedom and democracy. From such comments, as Pew documents, a few stand 
out,  for example, where users from all around the world wrote: “Let their voices be heard!   
PEACEFULLY.”     
 Iran’s protests in 2009 and their depiction in western media were mainly an effort by Iranian 
citizens documenting the events online for the world to hear their voice. Besides the organizing 
role of social media platforms, mostly Twitter and Facebook, it was the objective of access to 
uncensored information that was prominent and important during those days. As previously 
mentioned, in an attempt to shut down the flow of information, the Iranian government put 
restrictions on the Internet, such as reducing internet speed and blocking websites, and also 
restricting western media access to gather reports and produce news. However, one particular event 
led to cracking the gatekeeping efforts of the state media and the government, and that was the 
murder of Neda Agha-Soltan: she was killed during the protests with a single gunshot to the chest, 
and her death became the icon of the Iranian movement for freedom (“Behind the Photo That 
Captured an Iranian Woman’s Last Moments of Life”).  Neda’s death sparked a series of online 
reactions from users on social media platforms as reported by CNN: “RIP NEDA, The World cries 
seeing your last breath, you didn't die in vain. We remember you,” a comment by a user from  
Nashville, Tennessee, or, “The final moments of her tender young life leaked into the pavement of  
Karegeh Street today, captured by cell phone cameras,” a comment published on Newsvine.com. 
Another comment says: “And not long after, took on new life, flickering across computer screens 
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around the world on YouTube, and even CNN.”  “Neda, ojala que tu muerte no sea en vano,” one 
poster tweeted in Spanish. “Neda, I hope that your death is not in vain.” (“Neda” Becomes Rallying 
Cry for Iranian Protests - CNN.Com). Neda’s death became a worldwide trend on twitter with the 
hashtag #Neda attracting international solidarity.    
  
Figure 5: (“Death of Neda Agha-Soltan”)  
   
  
Figure 6: (“Behind the Photo That Captured an Iranian Woman’s Last Moments of Life”)  
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This incident circulated the Web and captured the attention of many western media and politicians, 
to the point that, as previously noted, Barack Obama dedicated an afternoon press conference 
addressing this murder, urging the Iranian government to stop using hard power on its citizens and 
reminding it that the world is watching the actions of the regime. On the other hand, the Iranian 
state media tried to dispute the story of Neda Agha-Soltan, attributing the murder to foreign agents 
such as the CIA, reported by the Iranian ambassador in Mexico (Iran’s Press TV Disputes Story of 
Neda’s Death - CNN.Com). The struggle between western media and state media in Iran in telling 
the stories of the Iranian protests in 2009 is an example of gatekeeping practices regarding 
intelligence/counterintelligence efforts. It shows the power of social media platforms and citizen 
journalists in facilitating revolutions by providing authentic narratives from the inside of events. 
As in Neda’s case, the videos and pictures taken and distributed by Iranian users curbed the validity 
of Iran’s state media narrative of the events, and Western media and other online users could access 
first-hand information produced by citizen journalists of Iran in order to learn the truth about the 
Iranian protests of 2009. When it is a time of conflict in a country, the state and the government 
holds the majority of the power to censor and block information (Wall). In 2009, social media 
provided a voice for those who could not have otherwise reached an international audience (Ali 
and Fahmy 66).    
Events of 2017 to 2019 in Iran: The Telegram/Instagram Revolution    
 If Twitter and Facebook were a mirror to show what was happening in Iran back in 2009, the 
Telegram instant messaging application and Instagram social media platform were weapons and 
tools for creating and fostering the 2017-9 uprisings. In 2009, social media was used to project the 
voice of freedom seekers in Iran to the outer audience, while in 2019, Telegram and Instagram 
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were tools in the hands of the protestors to organize protests and give voice to the internal audience.    
Iranians rank as the seventh highest Instagram users in the world.  This figure shows the popularity 
of this social media platform, with more than 24 million active users there, according to Financial 
Tribune in 2018. With a population of more than 80 million, this means around 30 percent of the 
population is active on Instagram, the report continues. Also, Instagram had more than a billion 
estimated active users worldwide back in 2018 (Dhillon) who could access content on this platform 
from anywhere on the globe. The most popular social networking application in Iran is the 
messaging app called Telegram, with more than 40 million active users in Iran, almost half of the 
population (Financial Tribune).    
The events of 2017 to 2019 saw the rise of Telegram and Instagram in the protests, 
comparing to the role of Twitter in 2009. The Telegram application hosts a variety of features that 
enabled Iranians have an advanced communication tool. Telegram features are, but not limited to,  
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calling, broadcasting channels with unlimited members, bots 
and polls (“Telegram (Software)”). However, the most important feature of Telegram is the 
privacy and security feature that encrypts users’ data. Pavel Durov, the founder, has been under 
pressure to give access to personal user data from the Iranian and Russian governments during the 
protests of 2017-9 for surveillance and policing which he refused to do so for privacy reasons and 
because Telegram is designed in a way that the platform functions through a complicated web of 
decentralized companies and, therefore, defies any state regulation (Akbari and Gabdulhakov).  
Twitter and Facebook applications in Iran remain restricted and blocked due to the aftermath of 
the 2009 elections. However, Telegram and Instagram are still accessible and have wider 
popularity in usage amongst Iranians, as the reported numbers suggest. The Iranian regime saw 
the power of social media during the 2009 protests and the power which applications like   
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Telegram and Instagram with such large numbers of users can pose, hence offering a real danger 
to the regime. These two applications provide an opportunity to create and share content rapidly, 
and they are also a communication tool because they have instant messaging features for their 
respective users. As these two are more prevalent in Iran with a massive number of active users, 
they would pose a greater danger to the regime compared with Twitter and Facebook in 2009 if 
another civic unrest happens. In 2009 Iranian protesters used social media to gather “international 
solidarity, overwhelming feeling of affinity and kinship among global internet users and local 
protestors.” That is why the Iranian regime “sees them [social media applications] as a threat” 
(Welle).    
 In 2017 to 2019, the uprising facilitated through social media applications reached a greater 
audience and became the most prominent social and civil unrest since the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. The series of protests happening in 2017, 2018, and 2019 had economic roots that turned 
into political protests as the events unfolded. The majority of protests from 2017 to 2018 started as 
a retaliation against the corruption and bankruptcy of credit unions that led to the loss of many of 
the people’s savings. The budget cuts for providing subsidies for fuel costs were another reason 
for the beginning of the protests (BBC; Associated Press). In Nov 2019, the Iranian government 
introduced a new increased gasoline pricing of more than 200 percent overnight without any 
previous announcement. This action drew protestors unto the streets (Reuters). Again, just as in 
2009, social media platforms became an organizing tool in the hands of protestors. However, there 
was a significant difference in usage this time.    
 As stated in the previous sections, during the 2009 post-election protests, Iranian Internet users 
were participating in social media to disseminate information to the western world in order to raise 
awareness. In the events of the protests from 2017 to 2019, Iranian users disseminated the 
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information mostly amongst themselves first and then for the outer audience on Instagram and 
Telegram. With more than 50 percent of the population as active users of these platforms, it is 
possible to reach a more comprehensive internal audience in order to organize a broader protest 
throughout the country. The numbers show that more than 21 cities were involved in the protests 
(Amnesty International: Over 100 Killed in 21 Cities in Iran Protests - Iran - Haaretz.Com), in 
comparison to the 2009 post-election events that mostly occured in major cities like Tehran, 
Isfahan, and Shiraz. This change in the use of social media by the protestors brought a change in 
the approach by the government as well.    
 Associated Press provides a detailed summary of the nature and events of protests in 2009 vs 2017 
(Lee). First, the root of the protests was different. In 2009, the protests were a revolt against the 
result of the presidential election, and in 2017, the protests have economic reasons. Second, the 
demography of protests and protestors in the two events are different. In the earlier protests, the 
major cities and provinces’ capitals saw crowds of people on the streets and in the events. In 2017 
protests, however, more mid-sized cities and higher numbers of people in almost all provinces in 
Iran were joining the protests. Third, the political demands of the people in the two events have 
changed as well. The 2009 post-election protestors were mainly focused on rejecting the re-election 
of President Ahmadinejad whereas in 2017 events the people were rejecting the whole system and 
the regime. The next difference between the two events is the issue of leadership of the protests. In 
2009, MirHossein Mousavi, a former prime minister of Iran and a prominent reformist figure, was 
the leader of the protests. His leadership shows that the political demands of the 2009 events were 
within the provisions of the Islamic Republic constitution, as the protests were tolerated by the 
regime at the beginning before they grew larger in numbers across the country. In 2017, however, 
the protests were leaderless, and they were rooted in the waves of anger of the people at the current 
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economic situation, resulting in a demand for a total system change. Another difference surfaces 
on social media use in the two events. In 2009, Twitter had been operating for three years, and 
Facebook was a bit older, and there were roughly a million Iranian users with access to smartphones 
to benefit from these tools. In 2017, the amount of smartphone ownership and Internet access had 
grown dramatically to constitute more than half of the country’s population. Also, social media 
applications were more widespread and accessible, and Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp have 
a higher number of users in Iran, and they provide an essential secure way of communication for 
the protestors: encrypted messaging. With a shift in the number of active users and the type of 
social media platforms that people use, the Iranian regime has changed its approach on how to 
manage and cope with civic unrest.    
 From gatekeeping and counterintelligence practices in previous years, the Iranian regime took a 
new approach to bring tranquillity to the country. The Iranian government took a very drastic 
measure in Nov 2019 when the organizing of protests was getting out of hand and started to pose 
a severe danger to the security of the regime: a total shut down of nationwide internet access for a 
week (“Internet Being Restored in Iran after Week-Long Shutdown”). The shutdown began on 
November 15th, 2019, amid protests against the new fuel prices, and it was massive enough to cut 
off Iranians from the rest of the world, as NetBlocks reports. The scope of this shutdown was not 
limited to Internet access alone, but included mobile and fixed-line outages as well. This was the 
most invasive and severe disruption in telecommunication services in the history of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (How Iran’s Government Shut Off the Internet | WIRED). The Iranian protesters 
had no access to Internet services to share information or to organize protests, and the outer world 
did not have any access to see what was happening in Iran. This time, the regime was successful 
in silencing the revolution with policing measures and arresting the protesters, and they were able 
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to cut off the fueling of the revolution by disconnecting the Iranian citizens from themselves and 
the rest of the world.    
Actions taken by the Iranian government to counter digital activism in 2009 and 2017-2019  
Social media can be a tool for democracy and liberating oppressed groups of people from their 
authoritative regimes. Unfortunately, at least in Iran’s case, the infrastructure for access to 
telecommunication is solely provided, controlled, and monitored by the state. Hence, the regime 
has abundant power to control the flow of information and can manipulate or disrupt any attempts 
to revolution or reform taking place on participatory social media platforms.    
What the Iranian regime regards as a “soft war” tool is a fight for freedom for the people 
on the streets. In 2009, social media was the forefront of political activism in Iran, and the US 
Department of State asked Twitter to hold on their scheduled maintenance and updates because of 
its importance during the Green Movement uprising (Pleming). The Iranian government’s 
approach in dealing with this situation was altering the narrative (see the discussion on the Death 
of Neda) through gatekeeping and counterintelligence practices to either bury the protest’s stream 
of information or providing alternative fake news of the events. What is interesting about the 2009 
protests and social media is that it shows the message in the political and cultural context of Iran is 
as important as the medium of transmission as well. Twitter indeed gives the user the ability to 
send tweets in a second with just push of a button, but it is the political, cultural, and emotional 
factors attached to a published post or picture that are in effect to let that message induce its 
potential and political changes in Iran such as when the death of Neda sparked international 
solidarity, and she became the icon of the Green movement.    
The social media sphere of political activism in the digital world has been growing fast in 
numbers, and when the series of uprising and protests happening between 2017 to 2019 came about, 
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it cast a wider net of protestors in many more cities in Iran. Niki Akhavan’s study on Iran’s 2009 
social media activities shows that the Iranian citizens used social media to create transnational and 
translocal spaces to practice a plurality of voices and exchanged views that led to “the emergence 
of new communities of interpretation that played an important role in influencing the discourse 
about the election” (84). In that time, the state actors and supporters also became increasingly active 
on social media and the state continued “to both suppress individual citizens’ use of social media 
and engage with this new media proactively” (85), Akhavan writes, which led in a widespread 
counterintelligence efforts to silence the voice of the Green Movement. Though Iranian protesters 
did not succeed in fulfilling their revolution in 2009, social media helped them in learning rapid 
information-sharing practices to circumvent state restrictions on media and achieve international 
solidarity.    
Iran has gone through a change in digital literacy since 2009. As is seen in the data projected 
in previous sections, digital media users have rapidly grown to include more than half of the 
population as active social media users. Political figures in Iran are also actively participating in 
social media as well. For example, the office of the supreme leader is active on Instagram with 3.6 
million followers and 6700 posts (https://www.instagram.com/khamenei_ir/). Such activities show 
that: 1- The Iranian government has accepted the legitimacy of social media and the Internet as a 
tool for change, and 2- Iranian politicians and heads of state use social media to provide 
counterintelligence when citizens become active in the digital world against the policies of the 
country (Duncombe). The constant struggle between the state and social media users in Iran 
continues as the government tries to control this massive domain to assert authority and track down 
citizens’ activities. However, Iranian protestors and online users have been somewhat successful 
in making “the real the virtual” and transmitting their message across the globe and within Iran as 
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well, which is why “The internet will serve as the virtual battle-ground against authoritarian rule 
and a march towards democratic governance” in Iran (Semati 53).    
In addition to international efforts to gain access to citizens’ data, Iran is employing 
different layers of ICT measures to track, restrict, and control digital activism. Small Media, a 
London-based lab focusing on censorship, has provided the following report and snapshot on how 
the Iranian regime is controlling the Internet on the infrastructure and government level:    
  
Figure 7: (“Revolution Decoded”)  
   
Social media platforms have their roots in the real world. It is the real people behind the 
user handles who are publishing information and participating in its circulation. This high number 
of connections between online users to the real world people makes social media users acting as an 
ad hoc assemblage of people in times of political uprising by publishing and expressing their 
thoughts and protesting onto the streets later on (Bebawi and Bossio). The institutionalized power, 
the governments, changed their attitudes towards social media and learned to use them to silence 
the people and shut down the protests. In Iran’s case, for example, every time that hashtags and 
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user-generated content become a trend on social media platforms, the regime and state media 
produce disinformation content to shut those down (Jenkins).    
When states become involved in such activities, they also provide false information to 
mislead, deceive, or confuse the audience purposefully. The Iranian regime is using USSR 
propaganda tactics to disarm its citizens in information warfare (Golovchenko and Adler-Nissen).  
However, the stream of information and digital activism is on the rise in Iran, and producing 
disinformation is not sufficient to counter digital activism on its own. Also, the Iranian diaspora 
abroad is growing in number, and they enjoy and benefit from the western countries' freedom to 
raise their voice, and the Iranian regime is taking extra steps in controlling these groups as well. 
For example, in 2017-8, a Telegram channel “Amad News” was responsible for sharing 
information about the shortcomings and corruptions of the Iranian officials on social media sites 
for Iranian citizens and helped with organizing protests. The administrator of Amad News was then 
arrested in 2019 and brought back into the country for trial for his involvement in the protests (“Iran 
‘seizes Exiled Journalist’ for Fanning Unrest”). Such activities show how the Iranian regime’s 
agents are monitoring the exiled citizens and diaspora population who work against the regime.    
Internet control and surveillance are not limited to Iran’s inside borders anymore. The   
Iranian regime has learned and adapted technologies to track the activists far away from mainland 
Iran. Some measures could be hacking to gain access to personal, private, and essential information 
of the opposition, or it can be counterintelligence efforts to bring back the regime’s opponents into 
the country in order to arrest and interrogate them. “The threat of targeted information collection 
through email intrusions and social media hacking enables state authorities to maintain a  latent 
pressure over activists,  even if they are no longer residing in the country” (Michaelsen 468). The 
Iranian regime is the sole provider of internet access gates to the ISPs in Iran. Therefore, it can 
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control the flow of information and even track the content of communications such as voice calls 
and text messages. These are some of the ways that the regime manipulates the infrastructure to 
access or hack citizens' information, Michaelson’s report shows. For example, two-factor 
authentication can be easily manipulated by the Iranian government as to when an online service, 
such as Gmail, sends a verification code to a user’s mobile number that can be read by the state’s 
agents as well.    
Conclusion   
 Technology, computers and mobile phones can be a tool for revolution and liberating people from 
oppressive regimes. Technology, in its general term, connects people from all around the world 
and make it possible for information to circulate unless governments try to suppress the flow. The 
convenient communicative features for a networked group of people and the massive amount of 
information around the Web have helped in educating the public and raising awareness about  
political issues.    
The number of active users grows in Iran more and more, and their social media activities 
become more complex than before, and the Iranian regime has started to employ a multilayered 
response to combat such unrest. The regime’s responses range from ICT measures to 
disinformation campaigns and policing tactics. Totalitarian regimes like the Iranian government 
change their response to social media activism when the number of participants and the scope of 
citizens’ practices change, and such governments take extreme measures to silence the voice of the 
protests.   
 Even though the Iranian protests in the 2009 Green movement or the 2017-19 protests have not 
yet been successful in comparison to their counterpart Arab Spring movement in the rest of the 
region to overthrow the dictatorship in Iran, social media participation has resulted in raising 
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political awareness and learning new ways to use social media platforms for content creation and 
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